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ABSTRACT 
The practice of real earnings management occurs at companies where investors’ protection is 
high and stringent corporate governance measures are put to place. The study examines the 
relationship between corporate governance attributes and real earnings management. In this study 
real earnings management is measured using three proxies, abnormal discretionary expenses, 
abnormal production cost, and abnormal cash flow from operations. The corporate governance 
attributes examined are board structure characteristics and audit committee characteristics. The 
sample consist of top 100 companies rated high based on Malaysia Corporate Governance Index  
2011 (MCG Index) on best practices of corporate governance. Financial companies are excluded 
resulted to a final sample of 78 companies. The relationships of board structure and audit 
committee are tested using Ordinary Least Square regression. The results reveal that certain 
corporate governance variables are effective in constraining real earnings management activities. 
The findings of the hypothesised variables, board structures and audit committee. The study find 
that only board size and directors expertise constrain earnings management, but none of the audit 
committee variables show significant relationship with real earnings management. It can be 
conclude that board size and directors expertise are constraining factors in constraining real 
earnings management. The finding of the study is important for market participant and policy 
makers in defining effective corporate governance mechanism that could address the issue of real 
earnings management. 
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ABSTRAK 
Amalan pengurusan perolehan sebenar berlaku di syarikat-syarikat di mana perlindungan pelabur 
adalah langkah tadbir urus korporat yang tinggi dan ketat diletakkan ke tempat. Kajian ini 
mengkaji hubungan antara ciri-ciri tadbir urus korporat dan pengurusan pendapatan sebenar. 
Dalam kajian ini, pengurusan perolehan sebenar diukur menggunakan tiga proksi, perbelanjaan 
budi bicara yang tidak normal, kos pengeluaran yang luar biasa, dan aliran tunai yang tidak 
normal daripada operasi. Ciri-ciri tadbir urus korporat yang diperiksa adalah ciri-ciri struktur 
papan dan ciri-ciri jawatankuasa audit. Sampel terdiri daripada 100 syarikat diberi nilai tinggi 
berdasarkan Indeks Malaysia Tadbir Urus Korporat 2011 (MCG Index) mengenai amalan terbaik 
tadbir urus korporat. Syarikat-syarikat kewangan dikecualikan mengakibatkan sampel akhir 78 
syarikat. Hubungan struktur lembaga pengarah dan jawatankuasa audit diuji menggunakan Biasa 
kurangnya Square regresi. Keputusan menunjukkan bahawa pembolehubah tertentu tadbir urus 
korporat yang berkesan dalam mengekang aktiviti-aktiviti pengurusan perolehan sebenar. Hasil 
pembolehubah hipotesis, struktur lembaga pengarah dan jawatankuasa audit. Kajian ini 
mendapati bahawa saiz papan sahaja dan kepakaran pengarah mengekang pengurusan perolehan, 
tetapi tiada pembolehubah jawatankuasa audit menunjukkan hubungan yang signifikan dengan 
pengurusan perolehan sebenar. Ia boleh membuat kesimpulan bahawa saiz papan dan kepakaran 
pengarah mengekang faktor yang mengekang pengurusan perolehan sebenar. Penemuan kajian 
ini adalah penting bagi peserta pasaran dan pembuat dasar dalam menentukan mekanisme tadbir 
urus korporat yang berkesan yang boleh menangani isu pengurusan perolehan sebenar. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the study 
Companies around the globe are mandated to produce financial statement in the form of 
annual reports at the end of their financial year. Financial statement of a company 
displays the picture of an organization’s outcome and consequence of its activities. 
Management often uses this report for planning and control. Of this information, 
reported earnings are important elements that reflect the past operations and predict the 
future. Reported earnings are the addition of cash flow from operation and accruals. 
 
In preparing the financial statement various statutory requirements and regulatory rules 
are adhered to, such as company law, accounting standards, taxation law etc. Among the 
preparers of the reported earnings, managers and auditors of company play very 
magnificent roles and these roles may be influenced by the economic settings of the 
environment that they operate.  
 
The reported earnings are metrics that portray company status, effectiveness of 
management and depict its economic realities and financial prospects. Reported earnings 
numbers are important and serve as a candle light in providing costly, applicable and 
pertinent information to users, be it internal and external (e.g., shareholders, employees, 
investors, debt holders, managers and financial analyst) in making business decisions. 
 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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